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Thesis Abstract 
 
In recent years traditional liberal humanist foundations for respect for others 
have been challenged on the basis that universalist grounds have resulted in the 
exclusion of particular others from moral consideration or respect. This current 
questioning of the concept of universalism is of enormous significance, in that 
universalism has been one of the central assumptions of modern western 
philosophy and a foundational key to its moral and political theory. This thesis 
attempts to answer the question of what grounds are needed in order to justify 
respect for others; whether these grounds can be said to be universalist or 
particularist.  In attempting to answer this question, past and current arguments 
for and against universalism are assessed as to the scope of their moral inclusion 
and the adequacy of their justificatory grounds. Current arguments for 
particularism – as represented by posthumanism – are discussed in order to 
gauge whether they do indeed represent a viable alternative to universalism. It 
will be shown that even scholars who have ostensibly rejected humanism on the 
grounds that it marginalises others, still rely on implicit assumptions and appeals 
to humanist concepts regarding the universal equality and unconditional worth – 
and therefore respect – owed to human beings. Given such reliance, it is 
concluded that some form of universalism is needed to justify respect for others; 
that universalism and particularism are indeed mutually dependant. The thesis 
then concentrates on gauging the efficacy of current critical liberal and humanist 
arguments for respect. These include an assessment of present day 
utilitarianism, where it is shown that the inclusion of animals within the realm of 
moral consideration results in the exclusion of certain humans from the same 
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realm; in short, that utilitarianism’s foundational assumptions do not adequately 
justify respect. It is also shown that other current humanist scholars who have 
attempted either to reconceptualise traditional grounds for respect or to broaden 
the scope of moral consideration to those traditionally excluded from such 
consideration with arguments based on self-determination, rationality or 
intuition, also prove inadequate. It is concluded that an ontological 
understanding of human being is needed in order to provide an adequate 
foundation for the justification of respect for others. Such a foundation, albeit 
partial in its conception, is subsequently offered; one that emphasises a 
communal, as opposed to an atomistic, conception of human being and that 
seeks to balance the tension between particularism and universalism by showing 
a common structure of human ethical practice that does not occlude difference. 
It is suggested that this common structure is the universal human practice of 
communal accountability, which itself is inextricably linked to communal 
standards of value and justice. As these communal practices are foundational 
both to human being and to ethics itself, it is finally concluded that communal 
practices provide the universal grounds needed in order to justify respect for 
others. 
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Introduction  
 
This thesis attempts to answer the question of what grounds are needed in order 
to justify respect for others. This question has become particularly pertinent in 
recent years as traditional liberal humanist foundations for respect have been 
challenged on the basis that such universalist grounds have resulted in the 
exclusion of particular others from moral consideration or respect. The current 
questioning of the concept of universalism is, moreover, of enormous 
significance, given that universalism has been one of the central assumptions of 
modern western philosophy and a foundational key to its moral and political 
theory. The question arises; why have these foundations come to be seen as 
exclusionary? To address this question we shall, in Chapter One, outline the 
reasons why such a critique has come about historically, focusing specifically on 
the ways in which western philosophy has been seen to fail in regards to the 
scope of its application, its justificatory grounds regarding universal moral 
consideration, and in its apparent dichotomy between the individual and the 
community. It should be stressed that this is only a presentation of the standard 
or non-nuanced account of western philosophy – as opposed to a critical 
appraisal of this standard account – for it is this standard interpretation, while at 
times a philosophical straw-man, which has continued to persist and which has 
provided much of the impetus to the wholesale rejection of universal humanism. 
 
We will then explore the recent posthumanist challenges to universal concepts 
of human being in detail, firstly at a broad theoretical level in Chapter Two and 
then at an applied level in Chapter Three, as posthumanist scholars seek to apply 
 2
such theories to particular instances of marginalisation and oppression. While 
posthumanists have objected to western philosophy on a number of different 
grounds, one of their major objections to universalism has been its exclusion or 
marginalisation of difference, and as such, these theories can be seen as 
arguments for particularism; for the recognition of difference over sameness. 
We will see that posthumanist critiques of universalist assumptions within 
humanism are themselves based on unacknowledged ethical assumptions of 
universal value and respect for others. As these assumptions are implied rather 
than explicitly justified, they become reliant upon the rhetorical force of their 
arguments alone, leaving justification for respect for others without any logical 
or arguable foundation and therefore highly vulnerable to the contingencies of 
social persuasion and sentiment. For, in explicitly eschewing any metaphysical 
grounds for respect, posthumanist scholars fail to provide any grounds as to why 
we should, or ought, to respect others at all. 
 
Following the discussion in the above-stated chapters, it is concluded that some 
form of universalism is needed to ground respect for the particular; in order to 
justify why we should respect others. The next three chapters explore current re-
conceptualisations of universal moral consideration. 
 
In Chapter Four we discuss the current challenges to the grounds and scope of 
traditional liberal humanism through utilitarian-based arguments for the 
inclusion of animals within the scope of moral consideration. While classic 
utilitarian arguments regarding pain and pleasure (or preferences) are used to 
provide a universal standard of measurement in regards to moral consideration 
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for both animals and humans, we will see that not only does such a scale create 
new exclusions of particular humans, but that utilitarian theory still fails to 
provide satisfactory grounds as to why we should care about the pain or pleasure 
of others; in other words, why we ought to respect others. 
  
In Chapter Five we examine current arguments by scholars who work within the 
liberal humanist tradition but from a critical standpoint. These scholars attempt 
to address the issues of exclusion that have arisen from the universalist tradition 
by either reconceptualising traditional grounds for respect or broadening the 
scope of moral consideration to those traditionally excluded from such 
consideration, such as animals and non-rational humans. Again, we see here that 
the issue of justification for the respect for others is still not adequately 
conceptualised, showing that such approaches, which emphasise self-
determination, rationality, autonomy and/or intuition, fall short either in regards 
to their justificatory grounds or scope of moral inclusion. It is in this chapter that 
the concept of accountability, touched upon in earlier chapters, begins to be 
more fully considered regarding its role within ethics and human being; a role 
that is argued to be foundational in the next and final chapter, Chapter Six. 
  
It is concluded that an ontological understanding of human being is needed to 
provide an adequate foundation for the justification of respect for others. In 
Chapter Six, such a foundation, albeit partial in its conception, is offered; one 
that emphasises a communal, as opposed to an atomistic, conception of human 
being that seeks to balance the tension between particularism and universalism 
by showing a common structure of human ethical practice that does not occlude 
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difference. It is suggested that this common structure is the universal human 
practice of communal accountability, which is inextricably linked to communal 
standards of value and justice. As such, communal practices are foundational to 
both human being and ethics and it is concluded that they provide the universal 
grounds needed in order to justify respect for others. 
 
Before starting, however, it is important to clarify some of the terms used here 
and throughout the thesis. For  a number of reasons, the term ‘posthumanism’ 
will be used rather than ‘postmodernism’ or ‘poststructuralism;’ first, because 
the one term – posthumanism – is less unwieldy than the two; secondly, because 
the term more accurately reflects the issues highlighted in this thesis (i.e., the 
universalist assumptions in humanism rather than modernism or structuralism); 
thirdly, because the scholars often referred to by such terms (Jacques Derrida, 
Michel Foucault and Jean-François Lyotard), have either distanced themselves 
from their use or simply not used them at all; and finally, because current 
scholars working within this tradition have begun to use the term posthumanism 
in relation to their own work. 
 
The term ‘accountability’ is used in the sense of being accountable to human 
beings if or when we injure them in some way – and conversely, they injure us – 
rather than in the sense of the accountability we may have, say, to our employers 
concerning our conditions of employment. As Stephen Darwall puts it,  both a 
sense of injury, personal worth and an expectation of accountability are implicit 
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in the cry “Hey, you can’t do that to me!”1 – although it will be argued later that 
accountability can be assumed both on behalf of others and on an inter-
communal basis, as opposed to Darwall’s more individual conception.  
 
That which distinguishes ethics from merely prudential or practical 
considerations, as Jeff Malpas points out, is that ethics is essentially concerned 
with human worth; “what marks out the questions of ethics are just those 
questions that concern the propriety of actions inasmuch as those actions affect 
our own worth as human beings or as persons.”2 In this sense, the term ‘respect’ 
in this thesis is directly linked to the recognition of accountability; as intrinsic to 
the suggestion that some humans are unworthy of equal moral consideration is 
the denial of accountability towards such humans. Denial of accountability is, 
therefore, a denial of respect, just as the recognition of accountability is the 
recognition of respect; for, as shall be suggested later, implicit in such 
recognition is the acknowledgement that human beings are ends in themselves. 
 
                                                 
1 Stephen Darwall, “Reply to Korsgaard, Wallace and Watson,” Ethics, 117 (Oct 2007), pp. 52-
69; p. 53. 
2 Jeff Malpas, “Human Dignity and Human Being,” in Jeff Malpas and Norelle Lickess (eds) 
Perspectives on Human Dignity: A Conversation (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2007), 
pp. 23-24. 
